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Abstract
This short paper shows in an example of strategic market game that the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium converges to the Walras equilibrium, even in the case of an ex-
change economy with infinitely many commodities.
1 Introduction
Economies with infinitely many commodities allow to analyse issues as commod-
ity differentiation, infinite time horizon and uncertainty. In these economies the stan-
dard proofs of existence of a Walras equilibrium, as Debreu (1959), are no longer true.
Bewley (1972) made one of the first attempts to prove its existence in such economies.
In the context of cooperative game theory, Debreu and Scarf (1963) proved that if an
economy with a finite number of commodities is replicated infinitely many times,
then the set of core allocations shrinks to the set of Walras equilibrium allocations.
This result was extended by Peleg and Yaari (1970) to the case of a countable infinity
of commodities and by Gabszewicz (1991) to the case of a continuum of commodities.
In the context of non cooperative game theory, as far as I know, there are no con-
tributions on strategic market games with an infinite number of commodities. In this
paper, it is shown an example of a strategic market game with infinitely many com-
modities. The example is developed using the strategic market game introduced by
Shubik (1973) and Shapley (1976). This is a strategic market game in which there is a
trading post for each commodity and in each of them a commodity is exchanged for
commodity money.
This kind of strategic market game was analysed in details by Dubey and Shubik
(1978) for the case of finite commodities. In their Theorem 2, they proved that if
traders are replicated infinitely many times, then the price vector and the allocation,
at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to the Walras equilibrium of the exchange
economy associated to the strategic market game.
In the main proposition of this paper, it is shown that the same convergence result
is obtained in the example, even if there are infinitely many commodities. This result
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does not rely on Dubey and Shubik’s Theorem 2 because they considered a strate-
gic market game with a finite number of commodities and in particular the proof is
based on Kuhn-Tucker Theorem that holds only if the commodity space is a subset
of Euclidean space.
This problem is circumvented extending a proposition in Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995), on exchange economy with infinitely many commodities, to the
strategic market game. In Proposition 20.D.2, they showed that if an utility function
is defined on the space of bounded sequences and has an additive form with a dis-
count factor, then an allocation is optimal when it solves the first order conditions
of the Lagrangian function and satisfies the budget constraint. In Proposition 2, the
analogous result is established for the strategic market game.
2 An example of strategic market game with infinitely
many commodities
Consider an exchange economy with two types of trader 1 and 2. Let T1 and T2
be countable set, with cardinality k such that k ≥ 2, and let T = T1 ∪ T2. Elements
of T1 are the traders of type 1 and elements of T2 are the traders of type 2. Let X
be the consumption set such that X ⊆ `∞+ , with `∞+ = {x ∈ R∞+ : supj ‖xj‖ < ∞},
that is the space of non-negative bounded sequences. Elements of X are called com-
modity bundles and are denoted by x = (x0, x1, . . . ), where xj denotes the quantity
of commodity j. A list of commodity bundles is an allocation and is denoted by x.
The price vector is denoted by p = (p0, p1, . . . ). Each trader is characterized by an
utility function and an initial endowment. In this example, the utility function is
ut(xt) = ∑∞j=0 δ
j ln xtj , with δ ∈ (0, 1), for all t ∈ T, and the initial endowments are
wt = (M, E, 0, E, 0, . . . ), for all t ∈ T1, and wt = (M, 0, E, 0, E, . . . ), for all t ∈ T2.
Walras equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. A pair (p∗, x∗) is a Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy, if the com-
modity bundle xt∗ solves the trader optimization problem at p∗,
max
xt∈X
∞
∑
j=0
δj ln xtj
subject to
∞
∑
j=0
p∗j x
t
j ≤
∞
∑
j=0
p∗j w
t
j ,
(1)
for all t ∈ T, and all markets clear
∑
t∈T
xt∗0 = 2kM,
∑
t∈T
xt∗j = kE, for j = 1, 2, . . . .
(2)
As there are infinitely many commodities, the standard method of constrained
maximization, namely Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, cannot be applied to find the maxi-
mum of the utility function. By using the following proposition from Mas-Colell et
al. (1995), it is possible to circumvent this problem.
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Proposition 1. If the commodity bundle xt ∈ X satisfies the constraint ∑∞j=0 pjxtj =
∑∞j=0 pjw
t
j < ∞ and, for some λ
t > 0,
δj
1
xtj
− λt pj = 0, for j = 0, 1, . . . .
then it is the solution of the maximization problem in (1).
Proof. See Proposition 20.D.2 in Mas Colell et al. (1995).
By Proposition 1 and market clearing conditions (2), the Walras equilibrium is
(p∗0 , p∗1 , p
∗
2 , . . . ) =
(
1, 2δ1
M
E
, 2δ2
M
E
, . . .
)
,
(xt∗0 , xt∗1 , x
t∗
2 , . . . ) =
(
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
M,
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
E
2
,
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, . . .
)
, for all t ∈ T1,
(xt∗0 , xt∗1 , x
t∗
2 , . . . ) =
(
1 + δ2
1 + δ
M,
1 + δ2
1 + δ
E
2
,
1 + δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, . . .
)
, for all t ∈ T2.
(3)
The Walras equilibrium does not depend on k.
Consider now the following strategic market game, kΓ, associated with the ex-
change economy. For each commodity j = 1, 2, . . . , there is a trading post where
commodity j is exchanged for commodity money 0. Let Wt be the set of commodi-
ties, different from 0, that trader t holds and Wt be the set of commodities, different
from 0, that trader t does not hold, for all t ∈ T. Assume that each trader t can only
bid on commodities that he does not own and can only send to the market commodi-
ties that he owns. Hence, each trader has only one strategy for each commodity. The
strategy sets are
St = {(qt1, bt2, qt3, bt4, . . . ) ∈ `∞+ : qtj ≤ E, for all j ∈Wt, and ∑
j∈Wt
btj ≤ M}, for all t ∈ T1,
St = {(bt1, qt2, bt3, qt4, . . . ) ∈ `∞+ : qtj ≤ E, for all j ∈Wt, and ∑
j∈Wt
btj ≤ M}, for all t ∈ T2,
where qtj denotes the quantity of commodity j that trader t offers to sale, with j ∈Wt,
and btj denotes the amount of commodity money that trader t bids on commodity j,
with j ∈ Wt. Let S = S1 × · · · × S2k and S−t = S1 × · · · × St−1 × St+1 × · · · × S2k.
Let s, st and s−t be elements of S, St and S−t respectively. For all s ∈ S, p(s) is a price
vector determined according the following rule
pj(s) =

bj
qj
if qj 6= 0
0 if qj = 0
(4)
for j = 1, 2, . . . . If j is odd, bj = ∑t∈T2 b
t
j and qj = ∑t∈T1 q
t
j. If j is even, bj = ∑t∈T1 b
t
j
and qj = ∑t∈T2 q
t
j. For all s ∈ S, trader t’s commodity bundle is a vector xt(s) ∈ X
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such that
xt0(s) = M− ∑
j∈Wt
btj + ∑
j∈Wt
qtj pj,
xtj(s) = E− qtj, for all j ∈Wt,
xtj(s) =

btj
pj
if pj 6= 0
0 if pj = 0
, for all j ∈Wt.
(5)
The payoff function of trader t is
pit(s) = ln
(
M− ∑
j∈Wt
btj + ∑
j∈Wt
qtj
bj
qtj + q
t
j
)
+ ∑
j∈Wt
δj ln(E− qtj) + ∑
j∈Wt
δj ln btj
qj
btj + b
t
j
,
where qtj = qj − qtj and b
t
j = bj − btj . The notion of interior type symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is now introduced.
Definition 2. An sˆ ∈ S is an interior type symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium1 of the
strategic market game kΓ, if all traders of the same type play the same strategies, and if sˆt
solve the following maximization problem at sˆ−t,
max
st∈St
ln
(
M− ∑
j∈Wt
btj + ∑
j∈Wt
qtj
bj
qtj + q
t
j
)
+ ∑
j∈Wt
δj ln(E− qtj) + ∑
j∈Wt
δj ln btj
qj
btj + b
t
j
subject to ∑
j∈Wt
btj < M
qtj < E, for all j ∈Wt,
(6)
for all t ∈ T.
As before, since each trader has an infinite number of strategies, the standard
method of constrained maximization cannot be applied to find the maximum of the
payoff function. By using the following proposition, that is the analogous of Propo-
sition 1 for the strategic market game, it is possible to circumvent this problem.
Proposition 2. If the strategy st ∈ St satisfies the constraints ∑j∈Wt btj < M and qtj < E,
for all j ∈Wt, and
− 1
M−∑j∈Wt btj +∑j∈Wt qtj
bj
qtj+q
t
j
+
δj
btj
(
1−
btj
btj + b
t
j
)
= 0, for all j ∈Wt,
1
M−∑j∈Wt btj +∑j∈Wt qtj
bj
qtj+q
t
j
bj
qtj + q
t
j
(
1−
qtj
qtj + q
t
j
)
− δ
j
E− qtj
= 0, for all j ∈Wt,
(7)
then it is the solution of the maximization problem in (6).
Proof. First, it is impossible to improve the payoff by changing a finite number of
strategies. Indeed, (7) implies that the first order sufficient conditions for any such
1Henceforth, for simplicity, only “Cournot-Nash equilibrium”
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constrained payoff maximization problem are satisfied. Suppose that there exists a
strategy s′t ∈ St yielding an higher payoff than st. Then for a sufficiently large h,
consider the strategy s′′t, with s′′tj = s
′t
j for j ≤ h and s′′tj = stj for j > h. Because
δ < 1, if h is large enough there is a payoff improvement in going from st to s′′t.
Moreover, the strategy s′′t is feasible. All strategies q′′tj are feasible because q
′t
j <
E and qtj < E, for all j ∈ Wt. If ∑j>h(btj − b′tj ) ≤ 0 then s′′t is feasible. Suppose
not and that ∑j>h(btj − b′tj ) > 0. Since st and s′t are feasible, then ∑j btj < M and
∑j b′tj < M. But then, the sequences of strategies {btj} and {b′tj } converge to 0 and
∑j>h(btj − b′tj ) can be made arbitrary small. Since ∑j b′tj < M, there exists an e > 0
such that ∑j b′tj + e < M. Hence, for large h, ∑j>h(b
t
j − b′tj ) ≤ e and then s′′t is a
feasible strategy. But then, s
′′t is feasible and gives an higher payoff of st but we have
altered only a finite number of strategies in the process, a contradiction.
In order to obtain a type symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for all t ∈ T1, (7)
becomes
1
M−∑j∈Wt btj +∑j∈Wt bsj
− δ
j
btj
(
1− 1
k
)
= 0, for all j ∈Wt,
1
M−∑j∈Wt btj +∑j∈Wt bsj
bsj
qtj
(
1− 1
k
)
− δ
j
E− qtj
= 0, for all j ∈Wt,
(8)
with s ∈ T2. Similarly, for all s ∈ T2, (7) becomes
1
M−∑j∈Ws bsj +∑j∈Ws btj
− δ
j
bsj
(
1− 1
k
)
= 0, for all j ∈Ws,
1
M−∑j∈Ws bsj +∑j∈Ws btj
btj
qsj
(
1− 1
k
)
− δ
j
E− qsj
= 0, for all j ∈Ws,
(9)
with t ∈ T1. Let G =
(
1 − 1k
)
. Combining the equations in (8) and in (9), for all
commodities j = 1, 2, . . . , the Cournot-Nash equilibrium proves to be
bˆtj = δ
jG
1 + 2Gδ− δ2
1 + Gδ− δ2 + Gδ2 M, for all j ∈Wt,
qˆtj = G
2 1− δ2 + 2Gδ2
1 + G2 + 2Gδ− δ2 − G2δ2 + 2G3δ2 E, for all j ∈Wt,
(10)
for all t ∈ T1,
bˆsj = δ
jG
1− δ2 + 2Gδ2
1 + Gδ− δ2 + Gδ2 M, for all j ∈Wt,
qˆsj = G
2 1 + 2Gδ− δ2
1 + G2 + 2G3δ− δ2 + 2Gδ2 − G2δ2 E, for all j ∈Wt,
(11)
for all s ∈ T2. In the next proposition, it is shown that if traders are replicated in-
finitely many times, then the price vector and the allocation, at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, converge to the Walras equilibrium of the exchange economy associated
to the strategic market game.
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Proposition 3. Consider the sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria, {k sˆ}, associated to the
sequence of strategic market games, {kΓ}, converging to Γ. The sequence of Cournot-Nash
equilibria converges to s˜ and the pair (p(s˜), x(s˜)) is a Walras equilibrium of the exchange
economy associated to Γ.
Proof. To find the limit of the sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria, consider the case
of k → ∞. Then, limk→∞ G = 1 and by substituting it in equations (10) and (11), the
limit of the sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria proves to be
(q˜t1, b˜
t
2, q˜
t
3, b˜
t
4, . . . ) =
(
1 + δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, δ2
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
M,
1 + δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, δ4
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
M, . . .
)
,
for all t ∈ T1,
(b˜t1, q˜
t
2, b˜
t
3, q˜
t
4 . . . ) =
(
δ
1 + δ2
1 + δ
M,
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, δ3
1 + δ2
1 + δ
M,
1 + 2δ− δ2
1 + δ
E
2
, . . .
)
,
for all t ∈ T2. By substituting these strategies in (4) and (5), p(s˜) and x(s˜) are obtained.
It is immediate to see that these are the same price vector and allocation obtained in
the Walras equilibrium (3) of the exchange economy, i.e. p(s˜) = p∗ and x(s˜) = x∗.
References
[1] Bewley T. (1972), “Existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many com-
modities,” Journal of Economic Theory 4, 514-40.
[2] Debreu G. (1959), Theory of Value, Yale University Press, New Haven.
[3] Debreu G., Scarf H. (1963), “A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy,” Inter-
national Economic Review 4, 235-246.
[4] Dubey P., Shubik, M. (1978), “The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading
economy with market supply and bidding strategies,” Journal of Economic Theory
17, 1-20.
[5] Gabszewicz J.J. (1991), “A limit theorem on the core of an economy with a contin-
uum of commodities,” in: Khan M.A., Yannelis N.C. (eds.), Equilibrium theory
with infinitely many commodities. Springer-Verlag, New York.
[6] Mas-Colell A., Whinston M.D. and Green J. R. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Ox-
ford University Press, New York.
[7] Peleg B., Yaari M.E. (1970), “Markets with Countably Many Commodities,” Inter-
national Economic Review 11, 369-377.
[8] Shapley L.S. (1976), “Noncooperative general exchange”, in: Lin S.A.Y. (Ed.), The-
ory of Measurement of Economic Externalities. Academic Press, New York.
[9] Shubik M. (1973), “Commodity, money, oligopoly, credit and bankruptcy in a
general equilibrium model,” Western Economic Journal 11, 24-38.
6
